CARLSONGOSS_REVISIONS (DO NOT DELETE)

4/13/2017 3:08 PM

GENDERING THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
JENNIFER CARLSON∗ AND KRISTIN A. GOSS∗∗
I
INTRODUCTION
Guns have come to occupy an increasingly visible place in American society.
In recent decades, most states have relaxed their laws regulating the carrying of
concealed weapons, and many states have expanded the right to use guns
defensively through Stand Your Ground laws. Congress has allowed a decadelong ban on semi-automatic assault weapons to expire and provided a legal shield
to gun makers and sellers. Public support for stricter gun laws has declined
sharply, while self-protection has emerged as the dominant reason for American
gun ownership.1 And, gun rights proponents increasingly are carrying guns
concealed, but also openly, into public spaces. The Supreme Court and at least
one Court of Appeals have validated these developments by recognizing an
individual right (albeit not absolute) under the Second Amendment “to keep and
bear arms.”2
These pro-gun developments and the growing pro-regulation
countermovement have provided occasion for legal scholars to re-examine the
Second Amendment, both as a legal principle and a social fact. However, these
examinations have neglected a powerful theoretical lens that has been hiding in
plain sight: gender. It is time to take seriously that the exercise of gun rights and
responsibilities is and always has been gendered, that the state is and always has
been gendered, and that these two dynamics are intertwined. Complementing
existing theoretical insights into the history of guns in America, a gendercentered approach can help make sense of this historical patterning—including
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1. Why Own a Gun? Protection is Now Top Reason, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.peoplepress.org/2013/03/12/why-own-a-gun-protection-is-now-top-reason/ [https://perma.cc/W83V-CP2E] (last
visited May 14, 2016).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
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the contemporary debate over guns in public spaces—in a way that other lenses
cannot.
Understanding the Second Amendment as gendered first requires
understanding governance as a gendered phenomenon.3 Gendered governance
encompasses two understandings: (1) the ways that the apparatus of government
(laws, bureaucratic institutions, and so forth) reflect and reinforce the traditional
social ordering of men and women—the governance of gender; and (2) the ways
that the state and its agents perform functions historically associated with men
and women—the gender of governance.4 The American state was created by and
in the image of men, while American state building has largely been about the
task of defining and redefining the boundaries between the male citizenry and
the masculine state. Since the founding, the question of firearms regulation has
been at the heart of debates over the state’s prerogatives in both the public and
private spheres. Though the article focuses on state apparatuses, it uses the term
governance, rather than the state, because the term governance is more
expansive. It incorporates gun policy as both a set of laws and a set of commonly
accepted practices, and it calls attention to patterned dispositions toward solving
problems.
In short, one way to understand American governance is as a gendered
narrative in which firearms figure prominently. The genealogy unfolds in three
overlapping but conceptually distinct modes of governance, each embodying a
different masculine ethos and each making different assumptions about women’s
civic incorporation. In the first, here termed “chivalrous governance,” private
male citizens crafted, embodied, and defended the rights and duties of
citizenship, while women, defined by their membership in the household,
remained outside the purview of the state. Citizen militias epitomized this era, as
they mobilized private firearms ownership in the service of the commonweal.
Chivalrous governance gave way to “paternal governance.” Here, the state
assumed many of the public protective functions, such as national defense and
policing, once left to male volunteers, and usurped private protective functions
over women and children left vulnerable by patriarchal structures. Paternal
governance is now becoming “fixed governance,” as an armed citizenry—now
explicitly including women—reasserts its prerogative over private and public
protection. This is not to say that private armed self-defense was absent in
previous historical contexts but rather that it has become central to the present
moment. The Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller,
followed by a parallel decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago, has lent particular
moral and legal weight to this push.5
Although these three modes of governance unfold chronologically, their
dividing lines are not sharply demarcated and their logics overlap. In this way,
3. See Wendy Brown, Finding the Man in the State, 18 FEMINIST STUD. 7 (1992).
4. See Rekha Mirchandani, “Hitting is not Manly”: Domestic Violence Court and the ReImagination of the Patriarchal State, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 781 (2006).
5. See McDonald, 561 U.S. 742; Heller, 554 U.S. 570; Moore, 702 F.3d 1993.
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this article’s approach is implicitly Foucaultian: the goal is to trace out broad
trends in governance, with the state being a central, but not exclusive, seat of
these trends.6 Following Foucault, this article recognizes that governance takes
particular forms at particular historical moments but that different modes of
governance can also co-exist.7 Thus, the article offers a soft periodization that
emphasizes historical thrusts rather than sharply delineated epochs. For example,
though the 1994 Violence Against Women Act is treated as an example of
paternal governance, by the 1990s, a broader shift toward fixed governance was
underway. Overall, the relationship between gender and guns follows a coherent,
albeit complex, historical progression.
This article begins with gender scholarship on the state, citizenship, and
governance as a framework for introducing the three governance strategies
proposed: chivalrous governance, paternal governance, and fixed governance.
Each governance strategy is considered in turn. Part III examines the laws and
social practices that demarcated chivalrous governance, with a focus on the
founding era. Part IV turns to paternal governance, highlighting how expanding
government purviews, particularly with regard to gendered violence, became
implicated in the regulation of guns. Finally, Part V analyzes the present period
of fixed governance, paying special attention to the increasing significance of
guns as everyday objects carried on the hips of Americans. Though much of the
analysis focuses on masculinity, the article concludes by returning to broader
questions regarding the relationship between gender, governance, and guns,
including the contested place of women in the gun debate.
II
GENDER AND GOVERNANCE
With the legal meaning of the Second Amendment clarified by Heller and
McDonald,8 scholars working within a second generation of Second Amendment
studies have increasingly turned to the social life of guns, specifically how
Americans draw and then police the boundaries between citizens and the state as
a matter of law and everyday practice.9 As legal scholars, political theorists,
historians, and sociologists have documented, citizen–state relationships are
gendered in at least two respects. Gender serves, first, as a set of norms and power
relations that pattern social interaction—that is, what men do and what women
do.10 The “governance of gender” refers to how the state influences these
6.
7.
8.
9.

Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in POWER 201, 201–22 (James D. Faubion ed., 1994).
Id. at 219.
See McDonald, 561 U.S. 742; Heller, 554 U.S. 570; Moore, 702 F.3d 1993.
See generally JOSHUA BLOOM & WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., BLACK AGAINST EMPIRE: THE
HISTORY AND POLITICS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (2013); JENNIFER CARLSON, CITIZENPROTECTORS: THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF GUNS IN AN AGE OF DECLINE (2015); NICHOLAS
JOHNSON, NEGROES AND THE GUN: THE BLACK TRADITION OF ARMS (2014); ROBERT J. SPITZER,
GUNS ACROSS AMERICA: RECONCILING GUN RULES AND RIGHTS (2015); SIMON WENDT, THE SPIRIT
AND THE SHOTGUN: ARMED RESISTANCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
10. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX”
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patterns. Gender serves, second, as a set of logics that naturalize public
institutions, such that some “do what men do” and others “do what women do.”11
The “gender of governance” expresses this understanding.
The distinction between gender and sex is a familiar one: gender is the social
laid upon the biological.12 Gender as a construct holds that women comport
themselves as innocent, dainty, docile, sexually available, and maternal, while
men be courageous, strong, assertive, independent, and paternal.13 Gender is
sustained by the presumption that men and women have different, perhaps
complementary social purposes, with men as public actors and women the
keepers of the private sphere. Gender hierarchies are reproduced as individuals
embrace them as natural.14 Such naturalized assumptions become absorbed and
reinforced within organizations, laws, and the state. Thus, gender not only
naturalizes power relations, but also equips institutions with an organizing logic.15
Social and political institutions reflect and reinforce gender by acting as
people-sorters, funneling people into appropriate roles and positions and
validating certain social concerns—which are always embedded in social
position—as more or less important.16 In the early state and market economy,
women’s concerns fell outside the nascent legal system’s purview and instead
were subject to men’s authority as householders.17 As a result, social institutions
privileged men and naturalized their interests as the interests of all. With this
arrangement women were formally or effectively excluded from the public
sphere and thus denied the opportunity—with some exceptions—to serve as
elected officials, judges, voters, jurors, and—importantly for the present
analysis—members of arms-wielding forces for public defense.18 As the
mechanism for governing the public sphere, the state reinforced gender relations
operating in the private sphere.
But the state also incorporates and performs in the public sphere gender roles
developed in the private sphere.19 Indeed, the state’s legitimacy may rest in part
(2011); R. W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES (2d ed. 2005); Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing
Gender, 1 GENDER & SOC’Y 125 (1987).
11. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3; Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,
91 AM. HIST. REV. 1053 (1986).
12. However, feminist scholars question whether the causal arrow is reversed here, such that the
construct of sex is social, as well. See BUTLER, supra note 10; ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE
BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (2000).
13. See West & Zimmerman, supra note 10; IRIS MARION YOUNG, THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND
OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY (1990).
14. See also BUTLER, supra note 10; CONNELL, supra note 10; West & Zimmerman, supra note 10.
15. See Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, 4 GENDER &
SOC’Y, 139 (1990).
16. See id.
17. See LINDA KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES (1998).
18. B. ANN TLUSTY, THE MARTIAL ETHIC IN EARLY MODERN GERMANY: CIVIC DUTY AND THE
RIGHT OF ARMS 12 (2011).
19. See EILEEN MCDONAGH, THE MOTHERLESS STATE: WOMEN’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Scott, supra
note 11.
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on how faithfully it reflects the gendered organization of society.20 With its origins
in a gendered social contract, the American state grew and evolved to project a
variety of masculine faces.21 These configurations of governance adopt distinct
gendered stances vis-à-vis the regulation and sanction of guns.
From this body of work, several considerations emerge. First, understanding
gender means paying particular attention to the relationship between the public
and private spheres and between men’s and women’s roles.22 Second, gender
exists in the multiple, not the singular: There are masculinities and femininities
that are contextually defined and historically specific.23 Third, gender is not
simply about bodies and norms; it is also about power relations that both shape
the social world and provide a legitimating framework to forge new institutions
of governance or remake existing ones.24
If governance is gendered, guns have been integral to defining its parameters.
Guns delineate the shifting and at times blurry boundary between private men
and public men. Likewise, gun policy reveals the evolving and at times
contradictory approaches to how society and the state mobilize and regulate
armed men in the private and public spheres. Gendered governance of firearms
has evolved in three modes: chivalrous governance, paternal governance, and
fixed governance. Each mode reflects different configurations of the governance
of gender and the gender of governance. As Table 1 shows, firearms are central
to defining how gender roles are organized and projected under different kinds
of gendered governance.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See PATEMAN, supra note 19.
See Brown, supra note 3.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
See CONNELL, supra note 10.
See Scott, supra note 11.
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Table 1: Guns & Governance

Chivalrous
Governance

Governance of Gender

Gender of Governance

State endorses public use of arms;
recognizes private use of arms (for
example, on behalf of state; think:
martial ethic)

Masculine Protectionism:

Women are relegated to the private
sphere; men are political actors.

Masculine private prerogative is constitutive of
the state; individual men are required to serve in
militia and are chief instruments of state power;
masculine prerogative is central to early modern
state formation

Public is an effect of the private

Paternal
Governance

Fixed
Governance

Paternalism:
State regulates and delimits public
and private use of arms (for example,
Masculine private prerogative is absorbed into
as state consolidation)
the state; individual men carry out manly
prerogative on behalf of state as a form of state
consolidation
Women are policy beneficiaries; men
are political actors. Women are
victims in need of protection; men are
state agents charged with protection Public shapes the private
role.
State recognizes and expands private Masculine Private Prerogative:
use of arms relative to paternal
governance (for example, on behalf of Prerogative to protect is reclaimed from the
state; individual men act out masculine
individuals; think: Stand Your
prerogative as a form of neoliberal state
Ground)
devolution
Women as actors capable of selfprotection; men as actors charged
with household protection.

Private is an effect of the public

Each of these styles of governance draws on gender ideologies (for example,
men as protectors, women as victims) as a means of organizing who should have
access to guns, on what grounds, with what kinds of restrictions, and to what ends.
Notice, however, that the manner in which gender is mobilized differs across
these modes of governance. First, the governance of gender varies with respect
to men’s versus women’s incorporation in the political sphere. Women were
excluded under chivalrous governance, recognized as policy beneficiaries under
paternal governance, and framed as empowered citizens under fixed governance.
Second, the gender of governance varies with respect to the relationship between
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public and private prerogatives. Under chivalrous governance, men’s individual
private prerogatives became a critical component of early state-building. In other
words, the public functions of the state were an effect of the private prerogatives
of men. Under paternal governance, the state consolidation of masculine police
power came into its own; the public prerogatives of the state could now be
marshaled to reshape the private. Under fixed governance, this process comes
full circle. Men and (to a lesser extent) women claim the prerogative to protect
and police as a duty of citizenship amid state failure. The relationship between
the private and public prerogatives calls attention to the third distinction across
these three modes of governance: Who serves as the guarantor of public order?
The three modes suggest three answers: the militia (chivalrous governance); the
state (paternal governance); and the individual (fixed governance).
III
CHIVALROUS GOVERNANCE
The early American Republic illustrates “chivalrous governance.” Chivalrous
governance centers on the male-dominated militia as a model of state-building,
both in a practical and symbolic sense. Able-bodied men were required to serve
in the militia and were chief instruments of state power. The masculine
prerogative to protect, built on a notion of household discipline, provided a
raison d’être for the early modern state.25 A masculine ethos of honor and duty
held sway, and guns were a means of upholding these values. Recognizing and at
times regulating this honor culture, laws and jurisprudence surrounding firearms
both reinforced and strengthened their collective, civic uses and recognized
men’s prerogatives within the home.26 Domestic relations, particularly with
regard to the protection of women, generally remained outside the state’s
purview.27
A. Chivalrous Governance: Militias And The Birth Of The Public Sphere
One body of scholarship on the Second Amendment takes the militia as its
point of departure.28 Citizen militias were articulated by Aristotle and
resuscitated by Machiavelli as a foundation of a true and virtuous citizenry and a
bulwark against authoritarianism.29 Indeed, Machiavelli placed the militia at the

25. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2005); Markus Dirk Dubber, “The Power to Govern Men and Things”:
Patriarchal Origins of the Police Power in American Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1277 (2004).
26. SPITZER, supra note 9; Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 237 (2008).
27. See, e.g., ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2004); see also Brown, supra
note 3.
28. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006); SPITZER, supra note 9; Brief for Professors of
Linguistics and English as Amici Curiae, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
29. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
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center of his concept of republican citizenship.30 He believed that militias were
more effective than mercenaries because militiamen had deeper ties to their
communities and hence more at stake.31 Motivated by duty, honor, and
protection of hearth and home, citizen militias were the centerpieces of good
government because of their ability to enforce order both within communities on
behalf of rulers and against rulers on behalf of communities.
The public bearing of arms as a civic duty dates back to practices surrounding
early state formation in Europe. In the shift from subject to citizen, heads of
households (by and large white, non-clerical, non-Jewish men) were expected to
generalize the obligations, duties, and prerogatives from their households to the
community at large.32 In seventeenth century Germany, for example, men’s civic
oaths included “not only a pledge of obedience to authority, but also expressions
of loyalty to the town and its residents and a promise specifically to protect the
community from harm.”33 Militia service, reinforced by historical lore, associated
masculinity with bravery, courage, and strength. Emerging out of this obligation
was a martial ethic that linked men’s self-understanding as householders to their
identity as citizens and provided them with an arms-centric sense of honor and
duty.34 In this way, gendered citizenship, grounded in property ownership, carried
with it the abstract obligation to protect and the concrete requirement to bear
arms. The protectionist logic was rooted in the private sphere: “The gallantly
masculine man is loving and self-sacrificing, especially in relation to women. . . .
The role of this courageous, responsible, and virtuous man is that of a
protector.”35 Such household arrangements of early modern Europe provided
fodder to imagine order maintenance—that is, militias and later more formalized
state apparatuses such as public law enforcement—in gendered terms.36 The
personal became political.
In the early American civic republican tradition, good citizens (at this point
in history, white men) were those who participated in public life, including
through service in the militia. Militias were arms of and building blocks for the
nascent state. Men of high station moved easily between militia leadership and

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 7, 17 (2013).
30. Maarten Prak, Citizens, Soldiers and Civic Militias in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe,
228 PAST & PRESENT 97–98 (2015).
31. Id.
32. Because citizenship was predicated on property ownership, the citizen militia generally excluded
women—they were property, rather than property owners. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR
WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). But it is important to remember that because women were not
explicitly excluded, at times they were “provisionally included” or included to play a “supporting role.”
For example, in some areas, “[f]emale heads of households were expected to contribute to militia service,
but only financially.” Prak, supra note 30 at 93, 108. Here, the exception proves the centrality of
“household rule” to early militia service.
33. TLUSTY, supra note 18, at 12.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Iris Marion Young, The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State,
29 SIGNS 1, 4 (2003).
36. See DUBBER, supra note 25; Dubber, supra note 25; Scott, supra note 11.
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political leadership, and often held these positions simultaneously.37 In this
universe, masculinity equated to public virtue, while “effeminacy,” as applied to
males, signified excessive concern with private striving.38
Debates surrounding the Second Amendment in particular centered on white
men’s order-maintenance prerogatives within the public sphere. The founders
“were heirs to an Anglo-Norman legal tradition which required free men to keep
arms to defend the realm and suppress crime.”39 For example, under English law
going back at least to the Elizabethan era and affirmed repeatedly in the centuries
afterward, “private individuals are not only permitted but expected by law to
endeavor to suppress and prevent riots . . . [t]he law acknowledges no distinction
in this respect, between the soldier and the private individual.”40
From the founding through the early decades of the nineteenth century,
private men acted alone and collectively to police the public sphere. However,
the state—here, meaning the separate American states—regulated these
activities. States and their localities crafted laws to ensure that the private
keeping and bearing of firearms by individual citizens served chivalrous aims,
those that were “other regarding” and civic in their purpose. Early laws covered
two purposes for arms: the private keeping of arms for public (militia) service
and the public carrying of arms for private purposes. In both cases, the emerging
(masculine) state sought to define honorable practices associated with men’s gun
ownership while curbing its dishonorable excesses.
At the federal level, the Uniform Militia Act of 179241 defined the militia as
all “free able-bodied white male citizens” between eighteen and forty-five but
left the regulation of arms to the states.42 States assumed an assertive posture.
Many required men to own guns for public defense while reserving the right to
confiscate these private arms when required for public purposes.43 State agents
conducted door-to-door firearms censuses to ensure compliance.44 Armed males
served as defenders of the commonweal, as well as of themselves and their
homes.45 The keeping of arms was a civic right (and in some instances, duty)
subject to state oversight.46 States acted early to regulate the manifestations of
arms-bearing that exceeded this public function. In the late eighteenth century,
colonial and state governments enacted laws against carrying firearms in a
37. ALLAN R. MILLETT, PETER MASLOWSKI, & WILLIAM B. FEIS, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE:
A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1607 TO 2012 5 (2012).
38. See generally Stephen T. Leonard & Joan C. Tronto, The Genders of Citizenship, 101 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 33 (2007).
39. Inge Anna Larish, Why Annie Can’t Get Her Gun: A Feminist Perspective on the Second
Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 481 (1996).
40. Note, On the Law Respecting Riots, Routs, and Unlawful Assemblies, 9 MONTHLY L. MAG. 210,
218–220 (1840–1841).
41. The Militia Act of 1792, art. 1, § 1.
42. CORNELL, supra note 28, at 67.
43. See SPITZER, supra note 9.
44. See id.
45. See CORNELL, supra note 28.
46. See id.
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threatening manner or in crowded places, and in the early nineteenth century,
some states enacted bans on the carrying of concealed weapons entirely.47 States
imposed these restrictions even while constitutionally acknowledging the private
right of self-defense.48
Guns were regulated as a matter of public order, although different regional
cultures would shape the form of this regulation. Northern states tended to more
strictly link public gun carrying with collective defense and to consider the
practice a “civic right.”49 Whereas Northern states folded men’s prerogative into
state prerogatives, Southern states took pains to differentiate between men’s
honorable carrying, that which served personal or collective defense, and
dishonorable carrying, which courts associated with arousing public fear,
threatening public safety, offending public morals, or facilitating unmanly
duplicity.50 For example, upholding Louisiana’s 1813 ban on concealed weapons,
the state’s Supreme Court in State v. Chandler held that the law
interfere[s] with no man’s right to carry arms . . . ‘in full open view,’ which places men
upon an equality. This is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States,
and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if
necessary, and of their country, without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly
assassinations.51

This “culture of honor” arguably was shaped by the economic and political
specificities of the South relative to the North.52 The southern states’ command
of men’s use of force in the public sphere remained incomplete, as evidenced by
the problem of dueling:
Dueling in the southern United States formed part of an unbroken tradition of violence
. . . Courts and juries routinely acquitted those accused of homicide; it was an act of selfdefense to shoot your enemy when you saw him, because he might shoot you next time.
The fact that the antebellum South was an honor-and-shame society was related to the
relative absence of a central monopoly on violence. . . . By contrast, spiritualized
concepts of honor [in other words, in contrast to violence-centric notions], called
gentility or dignity by historians, spread in the North in the course of the nineteenth
century.53

While Northern white men increasingly framed their identities around
market relations (for instance, the “self-made man”), Southern white men

47. See SPITZER, supra note 9.
48. Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun
Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715 (2006).
49. Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right to Bear
Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 572 (2006); see
also SPITZER, supra note 9.
50. See State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); State v. Huntly,
25 N.C. 418 (1843); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840).
51. State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490.
52. See RICHARD E. NISBETT & DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH (1996).
53. Pieter Spierenburg, Introduction to MEN AND VIOLENCE: GENDER, HONOR, AND RITUALS IN
MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA 1, 23–25 (Pieter Spierenburg ed., 1998).
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emphasized “independency, mastery over female, child, and slave dependents,
the use of violence to enforce patriarchy, and the importance of honor to unite
the South’s white male community.”54
Regional variation notwithstanding, state firearms laws of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries accepted the association of firearms with men’s positive
civic roles. Regulations were designed to further these ends and facilitate a
distinct brand of chivalrous masculinity. The implicit association between
masculinity, citizenship, gun laws, and chivalrous governance is made explicit in
the case of Nunn v. State.55 There, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a law
that appeared to ban the open carrying of arms in public. To do so, the court had
to reject the prevalent understanding that arms-bearing was a purely masculine
function and decenter the militia’s constitutive significance to the right to keep
and bear arms:
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia
only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such merely as are used by
the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree.56

Legal cases surrounding the Second Amendment took place on masculine
terrain—they were focused on how men’s use of guns fit into the maintenance of
public order. This case, however, represents a departure insofar as it emphasizes
women’s capacity to keep and bear arms on individualist rather than collectivist
terms.57 Perhaps reflecting fears ignited during the Civil War that would escalate
into the lynch mobs of the Jim Crow era, women here are imagined as the
appropriate bearers of arms for self-defense. Only with the rejection of the militia
clause do women become imaginable as public arms-bearers.58
B. Chivalrous Governance: The Sanctification Of Men’s Private Prerogatives
Guns in the early American republic, however, were not simply about civic
duty. Another body of Second Amendment scholarship documents the broad
legal recognition and social acceptance of private gun use.59 Early jurisprudence
on self-defense in the private sphere considered it “off-limits” to government
intrusion, meaning that “self-defense is like breathing or whistling. It is like the
multitude of rights that those who debated the Ninth Amendment argued were
part of the innumerable rights retained by the people.”60 In the context of the
antebellum South, this presumption not only left women outside the purview of

54. Bryan C. Rindfleisch, “What it Means to Be a Man”: Contested Masculinity in the Early Republic
and Antebellum America, 10 HIST. COMPASS 852, 858 (2012).
55. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
56. Id. at 251.
57. See Larish, supra note 39, at 472.
58. See id. at 481 n.101.
59. See Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, The Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early
America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139 (2007); Johnson, supra
note 48.
60. Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-Defense? 2 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 187, 194 (2006).
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state protection but also protected the prerogative of white masters to
“discipline” slaves.61
Besides recognizing guns as enabling civic duty, the chivalrous state
empowered men to wield firearms in defense of themselves and their “castle.”
From the eighteenth century onward, state constitutions routinely—and
explicitly—incorporated gun rights as individual rights. Although the provisions
varied, Kentucky’s Constitution is illustrative: “[t]he rights of the citizens to bear
arms in defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”62 Though
states, particularly after the Civil War, declared gun rights on behalf of genderneutral citizens as doctrine,63 court cases provide insight into how gender shaped
the practice of gun rights.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, courts developed legal standards
defining the circumstances under which self-defensive force was lawful and
morally legitimate. These standards were self-consciously tailored to the
American context and applied both to the home and to the public sphere. “No
duty to retreat” doctrine was developed in concert with “the values of masculine
bravery in a frontier nation” to protect the right of the blameless “true man” to
fight back if provoked.64 Standing one’s ground was especially suited to the
American man, for “the tendency of the American mind seems to be very
strongly against the enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee when
assailed.”65 In Beard v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
individual who is where he has a right to be, and who reasonably fears serious
bodily harm or death, may respond with force to protect himself.66 Citing Beard,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court made the redefinition of masculinity explicit: The
old doctrine of retreat to the wall “may have been all right in the days of chivalry,
so called” but had become “unadaptable to our modern development.”67 Thus
the courts began to recognize a new variant of American chivalry, one that
understood male citizenship as each man to his own, untethered to civic service.
The prevalence of guns in nineteenth century America was fundamental to
the redefinition of the individual right to exercise violence. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota spelled out the connection in State v. Gardner.68 While it would
make “good sense” to require retreat to the wall when fights involved merely fists
or clubs, the Court reasoned, it would be “rank folly” to require retreat when
61. See MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY
AND LITERATURE (2003).
62. Johnson, supra note 48, at 730.
63. For example, the 1836 Arkansas Constitution read, “the free white men of this State shall have
a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defense.” This was modified in 1874 to “[t]he citizens
of this State shall have the right to keep and bear arms for their common defense.” Johnson, supra note
48, at 734 n. 94.
64. RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 17 (1991); see also Erwin v. State. 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876).
65. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877).
66. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895).
67. Miller v. State, 139 Wis. 57, 75 (1909).
68. State v. Gardner, 96 Minn. 318 (1905).
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coming face to face with “experienced men, armed with repeating rifles.”69 By
1921, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the “no duty to retreat doctrine” in
Brown v. the United States.70 Reflecting in private correspondence on the decision
he had penned, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes maintained that “‘it is well
settled’ that ‘a man is not born to run away’ . . . [and that] the law ‘must consider
human nature and make some allowances for the fighting instinct at critical
moments.”71 A few years later, this principle of masculine courage would be
tested in the case of Ossian Sweet, an African American doctor who moved to an
all-white block in Detroit and faced an angry mob shortly after his arrival.72 After
firing shots at the all-white crowd and killing one man, Sweet and the other
occupants of the house were tried for murder.73 In the two trials that ensued in
1925 and 1926,74 Clarence Darrow famously framed the Castle Doctrine in terms
of America’s past and present regimes of racial terror, asserting to jurors that
“[i]f you had the courage, you would have done as Dr. Sweet did. You would
have been crazy or a coward if you hadn’t.”75 Summarizing the acquittal of
another defendant in the second trial, Darrow noted in his memoir that “[t]he
verdict meant simply that the doctrine that a man’s house is his castle applied to
the black man as well as to the white man. If not the first time that a white jury
had vindicated this principle, it was the first that ever came to my notice.”76 With
this case, the true American man crossed the color line, but the emphasis on
men’s prerogative to protect remained intact.
The early state regulation and warranting of civilian guns, therefore, seemed
in line with the private/public divide whereby men’s public activities both
constituted and came under the purview of the state—but men’s prerogatives in
the home remained, as natural rights, outside of the state’s reach. This
public/private binary was implicitly gendered and embodied the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Public man acted for the state by
bearing arms; private man protected the home–castle and the women therein by
keeping arms.
Such tolerance for private prerogatives within the household, however, would
not last. Soon, the state that deemed men’s household prerogatives a useful trope
for forging early statecraft would expand to more explicitly define, endorse, and,

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 327.
Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
BROWN, supra note 64, at 34.
See generally KEVIN BOYLE, ARC OF JUSTICE: A SAGA OF RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
MURDER IN THE JAZZ AGE (2004).
73. See Michael Hannon, The People of Michigan v. Ossian Sweet et al. (1925) The People of
Michigan v. Henry Sweet (1926) (2010).
74. A mistrial was declared, and charges against all but one of the original defendants were
dismissed. In the subsequent trial, People v. Henry Sweet (1926), the defendant, Henry Sweet, would be
tried and acquitted.
75. MICHAEL S. LIEF & H. MITCHELL CALDWELL, THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATES: GREATEST
CLOSING ARGUMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW 302 (2006).
76. CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 311 (1996).
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at times, restrict those private prerogatives while continuing to demarcate the
public use of force.
IV
PATERNAL GOVERNANCE
The state began as assemblies of men acting in a voluntary capacity, often
with arms at their side. But soon a formal, if complementary, governing apparatus
arose: paternal governance. Two developments characterize paternal
governance: first, the state’s absorption of the masculine prerogative to protect,
and, second, greater efforts by the state to circumscribe public and private uses
of guns. Beginning in the early nineteenth century and accelerating after the Civil
War, government began assuming many of the public protective functions once
performed by volunteer militiamen, as well stepping in to fill private protective
functions over women’s welfare that had been the province of male householders.
Paternal governance arrived at a time when women still lacked the legal,
economic, and political standing to protect themselves. During this time, as
discussed in part III, courts and legislatures fortified individual men’s prerogative
to use protective force honorably to defend themselves and their castle. Thus,
under the paternal governance, a state constructed in the masculine image,
supplemented by legally empowered men, served as society’s protectors, while
women were understood to benefit from such protection. These developments
and their tensions helped lay the groundwork for the political battles over guns
today.
A. Paternal Governance: Policing The Public Sphere
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the state consolidated its
prerogative to protect the citizenry and to regulate privately held arms. America
witnessed the growth and professionalization of the fulltime military, the
National Guard, and the police, putting the authoritative wielding of firearms
firmly in state hands. The U.S. Military Academy at West Point was founded in
1802 to train army officers, and in the aftermath of the War of 1812, Congress
provided money to enlarge, professionalize, and—in the case of the Army—
centralize the military apparatus.77 On the domestic front, police forces
developed in 1850–1880 in most large cities and embraced military elements such
as ranks and uniforms to distinguish police from civilians.78 The bureaucratic face
of paternal governance was well in place by the Civil War.
The state also built up a regulatory structure, including gun laws at the local
and state levels and later federally, to shift the maintenance of public order
toward government. Laws regulating firearms, particularly in public places,
proliferated in the first half of the nineteenth century and later spread across the

77. See MILLETT, MASLOWSKI, & FEIS, supra note 37.
78. See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860–1920 (2004).
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country as states were added to the union.79 These laws banned dueling, barred
discharging of firearms in public places, and prohibited the carrying of concealed
weapons. Courts generally deferred to legislatures and upheld these laws.80 For
example, in Presser v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the state of Illinois’
right to bar a private paramilitary militia from parading without a license.81 And
in United States v. Miller, the Court let stand an early federal gun control law, the
National Firearms Act, on the grounds that it regulated guns that did not
“contribute to the common defense.”82 Although emerging from very different
circumstances, these cases reflect a common tilt toward state authority vis-à-vis
individual gun rights.
Even as the state regulated privately armed groups, it also empowered them
in certain circumstances. The National Rifle Association, founded in 1871,
received substantial federal support to operate marksmanship training to the
ultimate benefit of the U.S. military.83 Meanwhile, at the state and local levels,
authorities looked the other way as Southern vigilante groups such as the Ku
Klux Klan arose during Reconstruction to conduct a reign of racial terror. Even
the U.S. Supreme Court declined to intervene, as illustrated by United States v.
Cruikshank. 84 The armed vigilante groups of the South emerged as a backlash to
Northern efforts to arm Negro militias for the common defense of freedmen and
would outlast Reconstruction to shape the racial terror of the Jim Crow era. 85
Thus, as the state was empowering white people with guns, states were often
restricting firearm access to people of color, especially recently freed slaves.86
Under paternal governance, the state expanded its public protection
functions throughout the twentieth century. The three bursts of federal
lawmaking on guns—in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1990s—came in response to
growing anxieties about violence and disorder. The National Firearms Act of
193487 and the Federal Firearms Act of 193888 grew out of Prohibition-era
gangland violence and an attempted assassination of President Franklin
Roosevelt. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act89 and the Gun
Control Act90 passed in 1968 amid assassinations of key political figures, anti-war
protests, rising crime, and urban riots. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
79. See SPITZER, supra note 9.
80. But see Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822).
81. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
82. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
83. See KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA
75 (2006).
84. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
85. ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA
143 (2011).
86. R. J. Cottrol & R. T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist
Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991); JOHNSON, supra note 9.
87. Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq.).
88. Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.) (repealed).
89. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3711).
90. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.).
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Act of 199391 and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 199492
were the products of a gun violence epidemic fueled by gang wars over illegal
drug markets.93 As in previous eras, this disorder—both real and imagined—
compelled a collectivist response that entailed a bolstering of paternal
governance.
B. Paternal Governance: Protecting Women In The Private Sphere
When it came to the protection of women in the private sphere, paternal
governance was slow to evolve. Even as the state absorbed protective functions
once associated with chivalrous men in the public sphere, it let stand patriarchal
relations within the home and offered little if any recourse to women threatened
by violence.94 The sluggish evolution was historically anomalous, for in other
realms, women successfully enlisted the state to intervene on their behalf. Early
policy victories, such as prohibition measures in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries95 and state widows’ pensions in the 1910s,96 can be understood
as efforts by organized womanhood to secure state protection of wives whose
husbands could not or would not perform their socially prescribed role.
Surprisingly, however, violence against women in the home did not become
an enduring policy issue until many decades later. Although Massachusetts
Puritans outlawed wife beating in the seventeenth century, and female reformers
of the 1870s–80s called attention to spousal abuse and neglect, the state generally
deferred to the “family ideal,” which prioritized family privacy and unity over
female protection.97 The second-wave women’s movement, which emerged in the
mid-1960s and had institutionalized by the early 1980s, challenged those
assumptions. Battered-women’s activists turned to the state to protect women
from violent men. This effort began in the civil society sector through the creation
of battered women’s shelters, then shifted to legislative advocacy resulting in
public funding of domestic violence services and changes in laws and protocols
that would empower police, prosecutors, and other state agents to intervene in
abusive domestic relations.98 Coinciding with the 1970s War on Crime, the
movement enjoyed other policy advances, including the introduction of rape kits
and the criminalization of marital rape and stalking.99 Interestingly, however,
91. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.).
92. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.).
93. See RANDOL CONTRERAS, THE STICKUP KIDS: RACE, DRUGS, VIOLENCE, AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM (2013).
94. See Brown, supra note 3.
95. See RUTH BORDIN, WOMAN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR POWER AND LIBERTY,
1873–1900 (1981).
96. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).
97. PLECK, supra note 27.
98. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF
THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1982); Nancy Whittier, Carceral and Intersectional Feminism in
Congress: The Violence Against Women Act, Discourse, and Policy, 30 GENDER & SOC’Y 791(2016).
99. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED THE
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histories of these movements suggest that they placed little emphasis on guns as
tools of gender violence.
By the mid-1990s, however, movements against gender violence began to see
the paternal state as an ally in policing the use of guns in the private sphere.
Policymakers leveraged the moral language of the feminine sphere, alongside a
crime-fighting mandate, to summon the masculine state to restrain male power.
These understandings were central to the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), passed as part of the 1994 crime bill.100 This important legislation
empowered the state to figuratively enter the home of adjudicated abusers,
defying the state’s traditional deference toward men’s autonomy within the
home.101 The law banned the receipt, possession, and transfer of firearms by
broad categories of civilians (spouses, co-parents, co-habitants) who were subject
to a domestic violence protection order.102 The law also created a new arm of the
state—the federal Office of Violence Against Women—to disburse money to law
enforcement agencies and civil society organizations to enforce the new
regulations and otherwise prevent and prosecute domestic abuse.103 Thus,
VAWA represented an expansion of state authority into the violence-prone
home, giving police both a clearer monopoly on the use of force and greater
funding to carry out their mandate.
Although the law provided important tools for women’s protection, VAWA’s
implications for gendered governance have been ambiguous. On the one hand,
gaps in enforcement have persisted despite VAWA. Although police notification
and perpetrator arrests have increased since VAWA’s enactment,104 police are
not constitutionally obligated to enforce restraining orders.105 Meanwhile, the
association of gun prohibitions with restraining orders may, perversely, motivate
judges to deny restraining order requests altogether because of the gun
restrictions they entail.106 On the other hand, some critics have worried about
over-enforcement, wondering if the law has rendered women (as well as men of
color) more vulnerable to state coercion.107 Mandatory arrest policies, for
example, have drawn feminist criticism for undermining women’s agency by
disregarding their judgment about how best to ensure their safety,108 and in the
FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2008).
100. See Whittier, supra note 98.
101. BUMILLER, supra note 99; JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
103. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Violence Against Women, About the Office,
https://www.justice.gov/ovw/about-office [https://perma.cc/85GH-TSUR].
104. See Hyunkag Cho & Dina J. Wilke, How Has the Violence Against Women Act Affected the
Response of the Criminal Justice System to Domestic Violence? 32 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 125 (2005).
105. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005).
106. See Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Fire Arms Bans, 14 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 1 (2005).
107. BUMILLER, supra note 99.
108. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657 (2004).
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process potentially increasing harm to women.109 Similar worries about
unintended consequences have surrounded policies requiring the seizure or
surrender of firearms from abusers. These debates epitomize risks inherent in the
patriarchal bargain.110 Women summoned the state to challenge patriarchal
norms and power arrangements but then found themselves subject to new forms
of paternalism.111
The 1994 VAWA was also beset by another set of contradictions endemic to
paternal governance. The law followed a precedent of government exceptions:
Police officers were exempt from VAWA’s protective-order provision, even
though police families experience elevated rates of domestic violence.112 This was
not new. The 1968 Gun Control Act barred certain classes of presumptively
dangerous people (felons, indicted persons, fugitives, drug addicts, and
adjudicated “mental defectives”) from possessing firearms113 but carved out an
exception for firearms “issued for the use of” government agencies.114 Thus, it
was possible to deny firearm rights to presumptively dangerous individuals in
their capacity as private citizens, while guaranteeing firearm rights to these same
classes of people operating as agents of the state.115 The government exception
effectively ensured that regulation of firearms in the private sphere would not
interfere with the state’s prerogative power.
Soon after VAWA’s passage, two cornerstones of paternal governance—the
bureaucratization of public protection and the extension of the state into the
private sphere—collided over the issue of firearm rights. The 1996 Lautenberg
Amendment barred all domestic violence misdemeanants—whether civilians or
state agents—from obtaining, possessing, or transferring a firearm.116 The
Amendment and subsequent legal challenges forced a difficult reckoning
between the two incarnations of paternal governance, that which deploys armed
men in public protection and that which seeks to protect women in the private

109. See Radha Iyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence? Evidence from
Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws, 93 J. PUB. ECON. (2009).
110. See Heidi I. Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More
Progressive Union, 3 CAP. & CLASS, Summer 1979, at 17.
111. See Sack, supra note 108; Brown, supra note 3.
112. See Peter H. Neidig, Harold E. Russell, & Albert F. Seng, Interspousal Aggression in Law
Enforcement Families: A Preliminary Investigation, 15 POLICE STUD. INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 30, 30
(1992).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2012). For a discussion, see May, supra note 106.
115. Officer-involved domestic violence (OIDV) is under-reported and under-studied. The
International Association of Chiefs of Police promulgated a model policy in 1999 and updated it in 2003,
but the policy has not been widely adopted. By one account, ten states have incorporated model policies
on OIDV, and another nine at least recognize OIDV as a distinct issue. See Alejandra Ávila, When the
Batterer Wears a Badge: Regulating Officer-Involved Domestic Violence as a Line-of-Duty Crime, 42 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 213, 226–27 (2015).
116. Pub. L. No. 104-208 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); see also Alison J. Nathan, At the
Intersection of Domestic Violence and Guns: The Public Interest Exception and the Lautenberg
Amendment, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1999).
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sphere. In Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,117 a city police officer argued that
prohibiting domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing guns interfered
with states’ sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment, specifically with respect to
states’ prerogative to establish the qualifications for police forces. In Fraternal
Order of Police v. United States,118 a police union argued that the Lautenberg
Amendment had an unlawful disparate impact on law enforcement officers,
whose employment typically requires the bearing of arms. Courts in both cases
rejected these claims. In Gillespie, the police misdemeanant also argued that the
Lautenberg Amendment violated his right to bear arms as a member, effectively,
of a state militia. Reluctant to weigh in on the original intent of the Second
Amendment, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana ruled
that, under any reading of the Amendment, the law should stand.119
These cases and the law that provoked them exposed the heart of the
gendered state as both the embodiment of masculine power in the public sphere
and the masculine agent of female protection in the private sphere. The
Lautenberg Amendment brought these two dimensions of paternal governance
into conflict. The courts deferred to the state’s interest in entering the home to
protect (mostly) women from male violence, even if that meant depriving state
agents of their arms. In entering the private sphere to police traditional masculine
prerogatives, the law simultaneously delineated new boundaries for the state in
the public sphere.
V
FIXED GOVERNANCE
For at least two generations, paternal governance has been troubled. Public
trust in government’s capacity to solve problems has plunged.120 Violent crime
has served as a particularly visible manifestation of the failure of governance, as
has the state’s hyper-militarized reaction to social disorder. When the state
underperforms or overreacts, private gun ownership may offer an enticing
alternative.121 Advocates of a muscular gun culture seek to fix public governance
in two senses of the word: first, by neutering the state and, second, by rectifying
the problems that state failure presents. “Fixed governance” describes the
reclamation of the prerogative to protect by individuals (mostly men) from the
state. The status of men and women as political actors is characterized by their

117. Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
118. Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997); Fraternal Order of
Police v. United States, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
119. See May, supra note 106. In two recent cases not involving law enforcement officers, the
Supreme Court upheld statutory challenges to the Lautenberg Amendment. See United States v.
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014); Voisine v. United States 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016).
120. Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-their-government/ [https:
//perma.cc/4Y5W-YMRU].
121. CARLSON, supra note 9.
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willingness to engage in private acts of self-protection that are independent of the
state but legally endorsed by it.
Gun policies established under paternal governance did not create these
conditions, but they may have inadvertently facilitated American gun culture’s
turn toward fixing the state. Both the 1968 and 1994 laws increased restrictions
on private gun ownership while validating the militarization and federalization of
urban public law enforcement. The decades-long War on Crime, bookended by
these laws, encouraged a victim-centric and individualist understanding of the
Second Amendment.122 As a set of both legal doctrines and social practices, the
War on Crime led to a logical, yet contradictory conclusion: The gun violence
problem was so massive and terrifying that it warranted a vast expansion of police
and prisons, but even this response would fail to meet the seemingly towering
challenges posed.123 To reconcile these logics, Americans—any one of whom
could be a victim—increasingly moved to take matters into their own hands, not
as republican citizens but as individualists. As Americans endorsed widening the
state’s prerogative powers in the 1960s and 1990s, a countercurrent was already
underway. That countercurrent favored “fixing” the state in the colloquial (and
gendered) meaning of the term: “neutering.”
Fixed governance is an emerging paradigm. It is most pronounced at the level
of the states, particularly those in the South, Midwest, and non-coastal West. Its
most noteworthy policy manifestations include relaxed regulations surrounding
concealed carrying that, increasingly, altogether remove permitting processes;
organized efforts to normalize open carrying; and Stand Your Ground laws.124 At
the same time, fixed governance has its limits. Federal policy has retained its
paternal orientation, although efforts to fix these arrangements have succeeded
on occasion. Two notable examples are a 1996 appropriations rider restricting the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control’s ability to fund gun violence research and the
2005 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which constrained the courts
as a venue for challenging gun industry practices.125 A handful of states, mostly
on the coasts, have also resisted the move toward fixed governance and,
especially since the 2012 Sandy Hook school shooting, have shored up their
systems of paternal governance.126 These states include California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Nevada, New York, and Washington, among others. Nevertheless,
most of the momentum over the past three decades—both legislatively and

122. See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S
POLICE FORCES (2013); Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise
and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1 (1997).
123. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); David Garland, The Culture of High Crime Societies: Some
Preconditions of Recent ‘Law and Order’ Policies, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 347 (2000).
124. CARLSON, supra note 9.
125. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 100 Stat. 3009 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7901-7903).
126. Jack Holmes, It’s the Fourth Anniversary of Sandy Hook. Here’s What We’ve Done to Stop the Next
One, ESQUIRE (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a51553/sandy-hook-shootingfourth-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/9P3N-JFER].
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culturally—has been in the direction of fixing, rather than reinforcing, paternal
governance.127
A. Fixed Governance: Reclaiming Men’s Prerogative To Protect
Over the last several decades, a distinct post-1960s gun culture has emerged
that has increasingly framed gun ownership in terms of personal protection and
self-defense. Though hunting used to be the number one reason Americans
owned guns, today self-defense is the primary motivator.128 Millions of Americans
carry guns concealed, and some gun rights activists now openly bear handguns
and rifles in parks, grocery stores, government buildings, and other public
spaces.129 These displays are intended to normalize the place of firearms in
everyday life and to reinforce the image of their bearers as good citizens with
guns.130 This emphasis on self-defense is reflected not just in what Americans do
with their guns but also in how they imagine the place of guns in the public sphere.
A majority of Americans—far more than the proportion of gun owners or gun
carriers—see concealed carrying as making the United States safer.131
This emphasis on self-defense reflects both a bottom-up and a top-down
political shift led by a gun rights movement that made a hard turn to the right in
the 1970s.132 The movement’s bulwark, the National Rifle Association, has led
the charge with a sophisticated strategy for transforming American gun laws.
These efforts have included the loosening of concealed-carry licensing systems in
most states; the preemption of municipal authority to regulate firearms and the
resulting obsolescence many local ordinances in many states; the enactment of
federal and state laws authorizing the restoration of firearms rights for those
previously committed to mental institutions; and the passage of robust Stand
Your Ground laws that effectively expand the police powers of private gun
owners.133 Although the National Rifle Association receives most of the credit
for these policy victories, the organization has been buttressed by national and
state groups promulgating even more hardline positions.

127. CARLSON, supra note 9; PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2014); GOSS, supra note 83.
128. Art Swift, Personal Safety Top Reason Americans Own Guns Today, GALLUP (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/165605/personal-safety-top-reason-americans-own-guns-today.aspx [https://
perma.cc/T9VL-YFES].
129. Matt Valentine, Tallying the Costs of Open Carry, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/open-carry-laws/436665/
[https://perma.cc/4XRF8SM2].
130. See CARLSON, supra note 9, at 129–31; Charles Fruehling Springwood, Gun Concealment,
Display, and Other Magical Habits of the Body, 34 CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 450 (2014).
131. Frank Newport, Majority Say More Concealed Weapons Would Make U.S. Safer, GALLUP (Oct.
20, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/186263/majority-say-concealed-weapons-safer.aspx [https://perma
.cc/8XGY-55Y6].
132. See GOSS, supra note 83; ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL (2015).
133. See COOK & GOSS, supra note 127; Kristin A. Goss, Defying the Odds on Gun Regulation: The
Passage of Bipartisan Mental Health Laws Across the States, 85 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 203 (2015);
GOSS, supra note 83.
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And yet, the shift toward protection-oriented gun ownership is not simply the
work of a cadre of gun rights proponents. Rather, it has occurred within a
“constitutional moment” centered “around the problem of criminal violence and
the widespread and enduring fear among Americans that our systems of public
security, primarily our criminal justice system, could not protect them from
becoming victims.”134 The Heller Court blessed the individual-protection
perspective and may have facilitated its absorption by the mass public. But
popular sensibilities about crime and punishment likely have also played a role:
the gun rights position “seem[s] to have an even stronger hand” because
proponents “can argue that gun ownership offers the most direct way for citizens
to assure their own defense against lethal violence by others.”135 Laws enacted at
the federal and state levels since 1968 resonate with the pro-gun position insofar
as:
It is profoundly mistrustful of government action, especially by New-Deal-type
collectivist social agencies.
It believes in a zero-sum game of security between victims and criminals.
It celebrates crime victims as possessors of the truth more important than scientific
studies or political hierarchies.
It recognizes lethal violence as a legitimate response to lethal violence.136

In this list, two ideas are especially relevant to the present analysis: the
rejection of paternal governance (“collectivist social agencies”) and the embrace
of fixed governance (individuals’ supremacy over “political hierarchies,” that is,
the state). The household, especially the suburban home, is not the foundation of
engaged citizenship, as under chivalrous governance, but rather a place where
governance is left to the individual: “[s]uburban life had a soft white underbelly.
If a malevolent stranger were to penetrate the geographic divide, the individual
homeowner would be largely on his or her own.”137 It is through the linkage
between the home-as-vulnerable and crime-as-rampant constructs that the
Second Amendment was recognized as an individual right in Heller: “the key
situation in which Americans want to be armed is in protecting their home against
a malevolent invader.”138
This centering of the Second Amendment on the home and the family
provides a ripe context for men to stake their status as men. Contemporary gun
culture often follows a familial prerogative that locates men’s rights and
obligations to own, carry, and use guns in their social roles as fathers and
husbands.139 This citizen-protector model of gun-oriented masculinity makes the
political personal: Men’s obligations, rights, and duties associated with firearms
134. Jonathan Simon, Gun Rights and the Constitutional Significance of Violent Crime, 12 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 335, 339 (2004).
135. Id. at 355.
136. Id. at 356.
137. Jonathan Simon, Consuming Obsessions: Housing, Homicide, and Mass Incarceration Since
1950, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 165, 173 (2010).
138. Id. at 192.
139. See CARLSON, supra note 9.
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are focused on their respective households and, to a lesser extent, on their
communities.140 As men, particularly but not exclusively white conservative men,
face socioeconomic insecurity141 and political and social threat,142 guns provide a
means to a version of masculinity marked by dutiful protection and justified
violence. As the New Right emphasizes a narrative about the state’s inadequacy
in the public sphere and its illegitimacy in the private sphere, guns provide a space
for men to practice and affirm their role in community and family protection.143
At times efforts to fix the paternal state have involved a frontal challenge to
state policing of gender relations in the private sphere. Four high-profile cases
exemplify this challenge: United States v. Emerson (2001)144; United States. v.
Hayes (2009)145; United States v. Castleman (2014)146; and Voisine v. United States
(2016).147 In each of these cases, a man barred from gun possession due to a
domestic violence adjudication challenged the relevant federal prohibitor either
on statutory or constitutional grounds. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court
either interpreted the law’s intent expansively, so as to reject the prohibited
man’s challenge or, in the case of Emerson, deferred to the Circuit Court’s
judgment along the same lines. Although the challenges failed, these cases
nevertheless epitomize efforts to fix the paternal state by pushing it out of the
home.148
B. Fixed Governance: Incorporating Women
Aided by the liberalization of state gun laws and validated by Heller and other
recent rulings, some gun enthusiasts are embracing the state’s policing
functions—and enlisting women in the cause. This process presents a dilemma
for women: By exercising their Second Amendment rights, are they becoming
more equal and empowered citizens, or are they acquiescing to a hyper-masculine
culture that their reform-minded sisters have long sought to tame? The battle
over the place of women in the gun culture is unfolding in conjunction with a
weakening of state capacity and a political project of shoring up American gun
culture for future generations. It also reflects a longer trend in which the
traditional distinctions between men and women are becoming unsettled.
Gun rights discourse as it relates to women imagines a more expansive liberal
and civic republican citizenship for women, one that extends to them the

140. See id.
141. See CHIP BERLET & MATTHEW N. LYONS, RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN AMERICA: TOO CLOSE
FOR COMFORT (2000); Jennifer Carlson, Mourning Mayberry: Guns, Masculinity, and Socioeconomic
Decline, 29 GENDER & SOC’Y 386 (2015); Angela Stroud, Good Guys with Guns: Hegemonic Masculinity
and Concealed Handguns, 26 GENDER & SOC’Y 216 (2012).
142. See BERLET & LYONS, supra note 141.
143. See Carlson, supra note 141.
144. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002).
145. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009).
146. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).
147. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016).
148. The authors thank Professor Emily Sack for this insight.
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prerogatives of private and public force traditionally associated with male
citizens. Guns have become for gun-rights women a tool of feminism in postfeminist guise. To that end gun-toting men began to echo feminist critiques of the
state, in particular why women should trade “a man for the man.” Thus, gun rights
advocates ridicule the idea that women can stop rapists with tongue depressors
or rely on personal protection orders or the 911 system to protect them from
harm. Instead, as National Rifle Association magazine features have long argued,
armed self-defense is the only practical response in the face of unreliable
institutions of paternal governance.149
Pro-gun men’s attention to the state’s dereliction of duties with regard to
women’s vulnerability has come with an alternative: men as protectors of women.
This emphasis on men’s capacity to protect the household—supplemented, at
times, by an exhortation that women arm themselves in men’s absence—is
oriented around outside threats. But this construction creates a blind spot in that
it casts women’s victimization in men’s terms by emphasizing stranger violence,
especially stranger rape, rather than acknowledging the exigencies of intimate
partner violence. For example, Stand Your Ground laws protect (presumably)
defensive violence in public, but these laws do little to address the kinds of
violence that women disproportionately experience: namely, violence from the
husbands and partners with whom they live.150 Faced with abuse in the home, the
law in most states would require women to retreat and presume that doing so was
possible. Such laws reveal the gender double-standard in the application of the
Castle Doctrine: “[i]t is difficult to imagine asking a man why he ‘didn’t just leave’
when an intruder broke into his house and threatened him,” yet this is the
question often asked of women who use force against their abusers.151 Although
states have begun erasing the distinction between stranger violence and intimate
violence, standing one’s ground remains far more legally and culturally accepted
in the public sphere, where both men and women are vulnerable, than in the
private sphere, where women are disproportionately at risk.152

149. See Kevin Lewis O’Neill, Armed Citizens and the Stories They Tell: The National Rifle
Association’s Achievement of Terror and Masculinity, 9 MEN & MASCULINITIES 457 (2007).
150. See Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered
Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (2014); Brandi L. Jackson,
No Ground on Which to Stand: Revise Stand Your Ground Laws So Survivors of Domestic Violence Are
No Longer Incarcerated for Defending Their Lives, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 154 (2015); Suk,
supra note 26.
151. Franks, supra note 150, at 1111.
152. Consider the case of Marissa Alexander, a Florida woman who fired a warning shot at her
abusive estranged husband. Despite a stand-your-ground defense, she was convicted of aggravated
assault and sentenced to twenty years in prison. After an appeals court vacated her conviction, she
accepted a plea deal and was released. Sam Sanders, Florida Woman in ‘Stand Your Ground’ Case
Accepts Plea Deal, NPR (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/25/366567307/
florida-woman-in-stand-your-ground-case-accepts-plea-deal [https://perma.cc/2YE9-RQJ6].
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Thus, guns can be powerful antidotes to “stranger danger,”153 but their
desirability and utility in the context of private violence is less straightforward.154
Following state efforts to address violence against women—particularly VAWA
and the Lautenberg Amendment—gun-rights proponents have sought to
celebrate the armed woman as both a symbolic counterpoise to the female victim
and as an archetype of pro-gun activism. As such, the contemporary pro-gun
movement occupies contradictory terrain in terms of gender. For one, men
reclaim the prerogative to protect and make the political personal. At the same
time, women’s capacity to wield violence against “stranger danger” is celebrated
while women’s unique threats from the men they know are often rendered
invisible. This dilemma has opened up a political opportunity for advocates of
greater gun regulation to mobilize women by highlighting the blind spots of progun discourse. Rather than fixing the state by shrinking its regulatory authority,
these advocates can marshal the state’s regulatory capacity, effectively placing
paternal governance in tension with fixed governance.
VI
CONCLUSION
Guns, along with the rights and duties they entail, have been central to
American citizenship and state-building from the Colonial era to the present day.
Historically, three architectures of governance—chivalrous, paternal, and
fixed—have organized these rights and duties along gendered lines. Chivalrous
governance centers on individual men’s prerogatives as the building blocks for
both legitimating the state and carrying out state functions, while acknowledging
individual men’s prerogatives within the home. Paternal governance elaborates
the masculine prerogatives to protect and carves them out as state prerogatives
distinct from those of citizens. Fixed governance is a reaction to paternal
governance by which individual men claim—and, in doing so, shape—the private
prerogative to protect.155
To outline these distinctive gendered arrangements, however, is not simply to
reiterate that guns are masculine-marked objects but also to show that their
gendering has been dynamic over time and nuanced within historical periods.
Guns may be consistently masculine, but a closer look at how and why gender
shapes gun use, gun politics, and gun policies suggests far more texture to the
relationship between guns and gender than is often acknowledged.
Further, this genealogy calls attention to the importance of the public/private
divide in shaping gun politics. Guns gain traction as gendered objects in relation

153. See Martha McCaughey, The Fighting Spirit: Women’s Self-Defense Training and the Discourse
of Sexed Embodiment, 12 GENDER & SOC’Y 277 (1998).
154. See Jennifer Carlson, The Equalizer? Crime, Vulnerability, and Gender in Pro-Gun Discourse, 9
FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 59 (2014).
155. For a critique of state monopolization of prerogative power, see Lucia Zedner, Policing Before
and After the Police: The Historical Antecedents of Contemporary Crime Control, 46 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 78 (2006).
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to the home as tools of men’s household prerogative and as weapons of domestic
victimization. They also matter as gendered objects in the public square, as both
spectacles of liberal freedom and instruments of “stranger danger.” Meanwhile,
gun regulation likewise operates across the public/private divide. In relation to
the home, gun regulation appears as a paternal intervention in the private sphere
and as a mechanism of protecting women. In the public square, it emerges as a
consolidation of prerogative power in the hands of public law enforcement and
as a means of social order. Such regulation often is justified as operating on behalf
of women.
Viewing guns in light of the private/public divide forces a reckoning with the
curious and under-appreciated role of women in gun politics. Increasingly women
are becoming a central battleground in the gun debate, with gun rights and gun
safety groups both claiming that they mobilize “on behalf of” this constituency.156
Although women tend to be more in favor of gun regulation than are men, there
is no straightforward “pro-woman” position on the issue. That is in part because
women’s victimization occurs both in public (for instance, stranger rape), where
gun rights arguments are focused; and in private (namely, domestic violence),
where gun control arguments gain traction. That said, gender is a relation such
that struggles over women are also struggles about men, including men’s
prerogatives, men’s rights, men’s obligations, and men’s duties. In this sense,
women’s increasing prominence as political symbols in the gun debate signals
that guns remain a tool, not just for hunting and protecting, but also for working
out the boundaries of a gendered politics of citizenship.

156. Kristin A. Goss, The Socialization of Conflict and Its Limits: Gender Identity and Gun Politics
in America, SOC. SCI. Q. (forthcoming).

